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Abstract
This paper examines the growth of the British commercial communities in the
Straits Settlements in the first half of the nineteenth century. It describes how
they emerged as a coherent commercial and political interest group, separate
from the Indian empire, with their own network of allies and commercial partners
in Britain. As such, the Straits merchants emerged as a significant political lobby
in their own right. It contends that in the process, they revived earlier notions
of Southeast Asia as a discrete geographical region, in which political and ethnic
diversity was bridged by the flourishing of maritime commercial networks.
Introduction
On the last day of January 1868 a select group of merchants and
dignitaries met in Newman’s Court, Cornhill, in the heart of the
City of London. Among their number was John Crawfurd, the aging
Scottish Orientalist, an ally of commercial interests in Liverpool,
London and Glasgow, and a leading voice in British imperial affairs.
Also in attendance were Edward Boustead, James Guthrie and
other longstanding business leaders in Southeast Asia. The assembly
established the Straits SettlementsAssociation (SSA), dedicated to the
defence of British commercial interests in the Straits of Malacca, and
∗ I would like to thank theBritishAcademySoutheast AsiaCommittee for providing
the financial support which made possible the research for this paper.
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Southeast Asia.1 Less than a year earlier, responsibility for the Straits
Settlements had passed to the Colonial Office in London, ending
decades of direction by the India Office and, until 1858, the East India
Company. The meeting was called to respond to the threat that the
Straits administration might impose import duties at Singapore.2 But
the more enduring reasons behind the formation of the association
were outlined in May 1869 by W. H. Read, the Singapore business
leader, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Read bemoaned the
failure of successive British governments and colonial administrations
in India to address the problems faced by British commercial interests
in southeast Asia, or to formulate long term strategies for the region:
The policy which has hitherto been pursued, if it can be called policy, has
been to allow matters to follow their own course, and if at any time it has
become necessary for the British authorities to interfere it has merely been
with a view to settle the immediate difficulty without reference to the future.
The consequence is that at the present moment the rich and fertile countries
of the Malay peninsula are as little known as they were at the time of the
settlement of Singapore, and the valuable trade in minerals and produce
which might under other circumstances have existed is still in its infancy3
Read’s reproach revealed the longstanding frustration felt by
commercial interests at the lack of attention given to their needs
and the failure to recognise the potential of Singapore, Malacca
and Penang as the centre of an economically and dynamic region
of the British empire. In Read’s view the Straits Settlements, Malay
Peninsula and Southeast Asia was seen as amere appendage to British
India, with little appreciation for the economic potential of the region
in its own right. The formation of the SSA was the culmination
of decades of effort by commercial interests in the Straits to get
their needs taken seriously, particularly in London. It represented
the arrival of Straits commerce as a voice in the imperial capital.
This paper is concerned with the origins and evolution of the
commercial communities of the Straits Settlements in the early
nineteenth century, and with their emerging sense of collective
interest. An important aspect was the creation of a network of
commercial and political connections and organisations linking the
1 Minutes of Meeting at Boustead’s Office, 31 January 1868, CO/273/24 (Colonial
Office Records for Malaya) p. 189
2 SSA to the Colonial Office 22 April 1868, CO/273/24 p. 199.
3 Read to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 May 1868, CO/273/25 p. 423.
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merchants and business communities of the Straits Settlements with
their peers, politicians and government officials in Britain. The nature
of the British commercial communities in the Straits Settlements
between 1800 and 1860 will be explored, including their relations
with Indian and British business, and their strategies for defending
their commercial interests. An important theme will be the growing
dissatisfaction with the East India Company’s governance of the
Straits Settlements. In order to resist what they saw as indifference
of Company rule to their needs, the British commercial communities
in the Straits Settlements, with the support of Chinese and Indian
business allies, reached out to like-minded business-interest groups
in Britain who shared their feelings of hostility to the East India
Company. Another important theme will be the impact of political
change both in Britain and in Asia on the mentality of business people
and their organisations. The responses of the Straits communities to
the insecurity which these changes caused helped to develop their
strong sense of collective interest and vigilance of decisions made in
the Straits, Calcutta and London.
It will be shown that this collective consciousness shared by
businessmen, and the effectiveness of their political activities, shaped
their sense of Southeast Asia as a discrete economic and political
entity, separate from the South Asian subcontinent and China, with
distinctive systems of trade and currency, social relationships and
traditions of diplomacy. This was regardless of the cultural and
political diversity of the region, and its division into British and
Dutch spheres of influence by the Treaty of London of 1824. Of
course, the notion of Southeast Asia as a separate and coherent
geographical region has been the subject of much debate. Emmerson’s
1984 article outlines the contours of this debate.4 While he agrees
with D. G. E. Hall and D. R. Sardesai that the Second World
War played an important part in establishing an awareness of the
political importance and distinctiveness of the region, principally as
a theatre of operations against the Japanese identified by the Allied
High Command, Emmerson shows that there were earlier roots to
the concept of a distinctive Southeast Asian region.5 More recently,
4 Emmerson,D.K. (1984). ‘“SoutheastAsia”:What’s in aName?’ Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, 15:1, 1–21.
5 Emmerson, ‘“Southeast Asia”: What’s in a Name?’ p. 5; Sardesai, D. R. (1989).
Southeast Asia: Past and Present (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edn), pp. 3–5; Hall, D. G.
E. (1968). A History of Southeast Asia (Macmillan, London, 3rd edn), p. 3.
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Kratoska, Raben andNordholt have reaffirmed this SecondWorldWar
perspective as a pivotalmoment in the recognition of Southeast Asia as
a distinctive area of political importance. They further stress that the
agendas of post-colonial independence and the rise of Area Studies as
an academic discipline placed a particular emphasis on how emergent
nation-states related to the concept of a distinctive Southeast Asian
region. They note, however, that with the more recent emphasis upon
globalization, scholars have taken a more critical view of the Area
Studies perspective, andwhat they see as an arbitrary andquestionable
division of the world into separate regions, which, especially in the case
of Southeast Asia, are of dubious validity. The invalidity of Southeast
Asia as a potential single nation, leads Kratoska, Raben and Nordholt
to regard the concept as a Western, European imposition essentially
designed to meet its global political agendas, rather than those of the
peoples of the region itself.6
The nub of the problem is that the ethnic, social, cultural and
geographical diversity of Southeast Asia make it difficult to base
a regional identity on commonalities among its peoples, in spite
of arguments from some that this might be possible.7 Another
obstacle, the division of Southeast Asia into separate British and
Dutch colonial spheres of influence, is seen as dividing Southeast
Asia still further, producing ‘a collection of countries facing outwards
and turning their backs on each other’.8 Others, however, have seen
maritime commerce as a unifying factor, even before the arrival
of the European imperialists. Reid stresses the important role of
maritime trade in connecting the islands and cities of south-east Asia,
creating a coherent geographical zone which was identified by Indian,
Chinese and Arab merchants engaged in commerce with the region.
To the Indians and Arabs, Southeast Asia was the ‘land below the
winds’, to the Chinese ‘the Southern Ocean’ (Nanyang).9 Similarly,
Tan Tai Yong’s recent work on the development of Singapore as an
entrepôt in Southeast Asia, stresses the importance of that port’s
6 Kratoska, P. H., Raben, R. and Nordholt, H. S. ‘Locating Southeast Asia’ in
Kratoska, Raben & Nordholt (eds), (2005). Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of
Knowledge & Politics of Space (Singapore University Press, Singapore), pp. 1–19.
7 Emmerson, ‘“Southeast Asia”: What’s in a Name?’, p. 21.
8 Williams, L. E. (1977). Southeast Asia: A History (Oxford UP, New York), p. 4.
9 Reid, A. (1988) Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680 (Yale UP, New
Haven), pp. 6–8.
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maritime commerce in developing wider linkages across the region.10
Of course, ambiguities remain: where does Southeast Asia actually
begin and end?Where on its peripheries does it fade into the adjoining
geographical entities of South Asia or China? Attempts to draw
analogies between Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean world have
been met with scepticism.11 Nonetheless, the case for a Southeast
Asian identity based on region-wide networks of trade and commerce
seems persuasive. Ruth McVey, in particular, has advocated that a
network approach to the question offers perhaps the most convincing
unifying factor for the region, conceding that as these networks rose,
changed and declined, so geographical definitions of Southeast Asia
have had to be amended.12 In spite of the division of the region into
British and Dutch spheres of influence in the nineteenth century,
the nature of British commerce in the Straits of Malacca, led to
the emergence among Straits British merchants and administrators
of a sense of Southeast Asia as a discrete region, capable of much
greater economic and political integration. Singapore was the locus
of this regional unity, linking through maritime trade the disparate
communities on the mainland and the islands of the archipelago.
Dutch resistance against British efforts to strengthen their network
of commerce across the region was fierce. They regarded it as an
unacceptable incursion into their legitimate sphere of influence. But
Dutch protectionism did not curb the conviction among the British
merchants of a ‘natural’ Southeast Asian unity. In essence this was
an imperialist revival of the notion of Southeast Asia as a coherent
geographical region, which had originated in the pre-colonial regional
economic integration described by Reid. This was the product of long
run maritime commercial factors, rather than the construct of Second
World War generals.
After unsuccessful efforts to establish a presence in Southeast Asia
over a century earlier, the acquisition of Penang by Francis Light in
1786 finally secured for the British a territorial foothold in the Straits
10 Tan Tai Yong, ‘Singapore’s Story: A Port City in Search of Hinterlands’, in
Graf, A. and Chua Beng Huat (eds), (2009). Port Cities in Asia and Europe (Routledge,
Oxford), pp. 207–219.
11 Sutherland,H. (2003). Southeast AsianHistory and theMediterraneanAnalogy,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 34:1, 1–20.
12 McVey, Ruth T. (2005). ‘Afterword: In praise of the Coelacanth’s Cousin’, in
Kratoska, Raben & Nordholt (eds), Locating Southeast Asia pp. 308–319, especially
p. 317.
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of Malacca.13 Penang was intended to become a naval base and a
trading post for non-East India Company British ships engaged in the
Country Trade (the intra Asian trade in which non-Company British
merchants in India were permitted to engage) and bound for Canton
in China. Penang merchants supplied Malay commodities brought to
the island from all over the Malay archipelago by local and Chinese
merchants aboard their perahus and junks. British ships then proceeded
to China to sell opium, Indian and Malay produce, depositing their
receipts into the Company’s treasury in Canton, in return for bills of
exchange payable in India or London. The Company thereby acquired
local currency to buy tea for export to London aboard its own ships.
The tea trade became the main generator of profit for a financially
straitened East India Company.14 But Penang was too far north to
command more than the trade of the northern Straits, and so it never
fulfilled the optimistic predictions for its development.15
The period 1786 to 1868 may be divided into three distinct phases
of commercial and political development in British imperial Southeast
Asia. Firstly, between 1793 and 1824 the Napoleonic Wars had
profound political and commercial effects on the region. Penang
initially benefited, especially from the British occupation of Malacca
in 1795, its main rival in the trade of the Straits. Between 1795 and
the return of Malacca to the Dutch in 1816, the Penang authorities
tried to redirect Malacca’s trade to Penang. There was even a plan
to destroy the Dutch settlement, thwarted only by Thomas Stamford
Raffles, who persuaded the Company that Malacca was too valuable
to the British for such a step.16 The Penang authorities nonetheless
imposed heavy duties in an effort to stifleMalacca’s commerce to their
own advantage.17 But the British occupation of Java and the Moluccas
13 Light negotiated with the Sultan of Kedah to secure Penang for the East India
Company. See Bassett, D.K. ‘British commercial and strategic interest in the Malay
Peninsula during the late eighteenth century’ in Bassett, D.K. (1971). British Trade
and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (University of Hull,
Hull) pp. 50–71.
14 Webster, A. (1998). Gentlemen Capitalists: British Imperialism in South East Asia
1770–1890 (Tauris, London), pp. 40–41.
15 Hussin, N. (2007).Trade and Society in the Straits ofMelaka: DutchMelaka and English
Penang, 1780–1830 (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen), p. 100.
16 Wurtzburg, C. K. (1984). Raffles of the Eastern Isles (Oxford UP, Singapore—
reprint), p. 58, 68–80.
17 Hussin, Trade and Society, pp. 108–109; Webster, A. (1995). British Expansion
in South-east Asia and the Role of Robert Farquhar, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang,
1804–5, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23:1, 1–25, especially p. 17.
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between 1811 and 1816 hit Penang hard, as British traders in India
were able to bypass Penang and trade freely with all of the occupied
Dutch possessions in the region. However, in 1816, Malacca, Java
and the Moluccas were returned to the Dutch, as part of the post-
war British strategy of strengthening The Netherlands against future
French expansionism. Matters were complicated further by the East
India Company Charter Act of 1813, which opened India and south-
east Asia to traders from Britain.18 In 1818 to 1819, fearful that
the revived Dutch authority would result in the exclusion of British
trade from the reinstated Dutch colonies, the British authorities in
Calcutta despatched Raffles to establish a new British port which
would secure access to the markets of Southeast Asia. The new port of
Singapore grew quickly to become themain centre of commerce in the
region, with a large population of Chinese merchants and a small but
growing number of British merchant firms. Dutch objections led to a
protracted negotiation with the British, culminating in the Treaty of
London of 1824.19 This confirmed Singapore as a British ‘possession’
and exchanged the British port of Bencoolen for Malacca, thereby
consolidating Penang, Malacca and Singapore as the British Straits
Settlements, and dividing the region into British and Dutch spheres
of influence.
The second phase from 1824 until the mid-1830s was one of
consolidation, in which the East India Company sought an effective
system of government and administration for the Straits Settlements.
But this task was complicated by turbulent events in Britain and India.
Between 1830 and 1834, all of the main British merchant firms
in Calcutta failed, exacerbating problems in East India Company
finances, which had been deteriorating during the 1820s, largely
because of the high cost of the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824
to 1826.20 In addition, pressure on the British government from
merchants and manufacturers in British provincial cities such as
Liverpool, Glasgow and Manchester, resulted in the Charter Act of
1833 which ended not only the Company’s monopoly of trade to
China, but also its engagement in commercial activities, reducing
18 Webster, A. (1987).‘British Export Interests in Bengal and Imperial Expansion
into South-eastAsia,1780 to1824: TheOrigins of the Straits Settlements’, in Ingham,
B. and Simmons, C. (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policy (Cass, London),
pp. 138–174.
19 Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists, pp. 83–105.
20 Tripathi, A. (1979). Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency 1793–1833 (Oxford
UP, Calcutta), pp. 157–207.
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it effectively to an agency of imperial government. The result was that
in 1829 the Company implemented reforms for the administration
of the Straits Settlements which were motivated principally by
financial considerations rather than by the needs of their commercial
communities. The Straits Settlements were defined as a single
administrative command, but subject to the direct authority of the
Company in Calcutta. This was a blow for Penang, which had enjoyed
a Presidential government, and a sizeable administration which
reflected that status. The Company pared back administration in the
Straits, reducing the number of administrative posts from nineteen
to eight.21 This reflected declining East India Company concern for
British interests in the region, an indifference exacerbated by the
Company’s retreat from the China trade in 1833. The dismay of the
Penang community at these changes was compounded by the decision
in 1832 to shift the centre of the Straits government to Singapore, in
response to the growth in the latter’s population and prosperity.
In the final phase from the mid-1830s to the 1860s, the structures
created in 1829 were tested by a range of issues:
• the outbreak of war in China between 1839 and 1842;
• efforts by the Dutch to stifle the trade of the Straits Settlements
through heavy trade duties
• Malay piracy in the Straits;
• problems arising from the economic development of the Western
Malay states, especially the tin industry, and the related issue
of controlling a growing and turbulent population of Chinese
labourers;
• and last, but not least, was how to pay for the government of the
Straits Settlements.
In the view of merchants from all the ethnic communities in the
Straits, it was a political and administrative system which was to prove
wanting.
Straits business interests: evolving commercial and political
strategies
Howdid these issues shape the development of commercial interests in
the Straits Settlements, and their strategies for defending themselves?
21 Turnbull, C. M. (1977). A History of Singapore (Oxford UP, Oxford), pp. 35–36
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Between 1793 and 1824 Straits commerce and merchants worked
closely with their peers in British India and the East India Company.
In the first few decades of Penang’s existence, merchants on the island
looked to the agency houses of Calcutta for their most important
commercial connexions. These were diversified firms involved in
shipping, investment in plantation agriculture (indigo, sugar, coffee
etc.), and banking. The agency houses exported opium to merchants
in Penang and throughout Southeast Asia, and in return, purchasing
Malay commodities from them for the Chinese market. These
relationships were strengthened as theBritish occupation of theDutch
possessions enabled the agency houses to develop their activities
in these territories. The Calcutta firm of John Palmer & Co., for
example, developed close links with the Java firm of Deans Scott &
Co., investing in coffee and sugar plantations at Tjikandi Ilir.22 In fact,
Palmers developed further connections across the region, trading with
Borneo and the islands of the archipelago, as well as with Java, Penang
and Melaka.23 On Penang, Palmer worked closely with David Brown,
the pepper planter, and Syed Hussain, the leading Arab Muslim
merchant and a member of the Achenese royal family.24 Palmer
actively supported the campaign of the latter’s son, Syf Allam for the
throne of Aceh during the civil war of the 1810s.25 Another Calcutta
firm, Fairlie, Fergusson & Co., worked with James Carnegy of Penang,
and the firm of Clark & Hare at Malacca.26 In the Acehnese civil
war, Fairlie, together with Carnegy and the Penang firm of Dunbar
and McGhee, supported the reigning Sultan, Jauhar.27 The Calcutta
firms also supported Raffles’ mission to establish a new trading base
in Southeast Asia in 1818–1819, which resulted in the foundation of
Singapore.28 Palmer and the other Indian houses campaigned through
their London sister agency houses for Singapore’s retention.29 They
lobbied vigorously on the question, with Palmer taking a leading
22 Knight, G. R (1975). John Palmer and Plantation Development in Western Java
in the Early Nineteenth Century, Bijdragen, 131:2/3, 309–337.
23 Webster, A. (2007). The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John
Palmer of Calcutta 1767–1836 (Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge), Chapter 5.
24 Webster, The Richest East India Merchant, p. 62; Hussin, Trade and Society,
pp. 308–315.
25 Webster, The Richest East India Merchant, p. 96.
26 Undated minute of Governor Bannerman of Penang, Dutch records, 1/2/29,
OIOC, BL.
27 Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists, p. 73.
28 Webster, The Richest East India Merchant, pp. 98–102.
29 Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists, pp. 87–88, 101.
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role.30 The agency houses, established a presence, buying land and
sending agents to Singapore.31 Thus the Indian agency houses worked
in alliance with the Straits commercial interests. This consolidated
the perception of British merchants in Southeast Asia that they were
part of a larger Asian British imperial entity which extended from the
Cape of Good Hope to Canton.
This early tendency for British merchants in Southeast Asia
to identify with the wider British Asian empire, rather than see
themselves as a discrete regional interest group, was reinforced by
rivalries between the commercial communities in the region, as shown
by the determination of Penang merchants and officials to reduce the
trade of Malacca. This reflected the fact that the two ports belonged
to rival European empires, with radically different social structures,
systems of governance, and cultural traditions of doing business.32
Penang merchants also regarded the growth of British commercial
enterprise on Java during the British occupation of 1811 to 1816 as a
threat. The foundation and rapid growth of Singapore also worried
Penang merchants, especially when Penang lost Presidency status
in 1829, and the seat of the Straits government was transferred to
Singapore in 1832. Certainly, before the early 1830s there had been
an absence of a clear sense of common interest among the British and
European commercial communities in the Straits. However, as will
be seen, attitudes changed rapidly, as a new ‘regional political and
commercial consciousness’ emerged during the 1830s and 1840s.
There were several reasons for the rise of this new sense of collective
economic and political identity among European (and to some extent
Chinese) businessmen in the Straits Settlements. Firstly, the decision
to downgrade the governmental provisions for the Straits Settlements
in 1829 signalled the marginality of Southeast Asia and the Straits
Settlements in the British imperial project in Asia, a message
which united the Straits merchants in alarm.33 Secondly, the final
metamorphosis of the East India Company into an agency of imperial
government in the Charter Act of 1833, weakened the perception in
the Company’s bureaucracy in London and India that Southeast Asia
was important in the Company’s wider strategy for Asia, as a supplier
of commodities for the China market, and a consumer of Indian
30 Webster, The Richest East India Merchant, p. 103.
31 Ibid., p. 102.
32 Hussin, Trade and Society, pp. 322–326.
33 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 35–36.
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commodities such as opium. The end of the Company’s commercial
function meant that its culture became more ‘governmental’, with
less appreciation for the needs of commerce, a development which
was noticed by merchants in Singapore, Penang andMalacca. Thirdly,
the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London brought the three ports
under British authority and heralded a sense of common interest
among the merchants and officials of the three ports. The spectacular
growth of Singapore’s trade and population assisted this process in
the long term. While initially Singapore’s success worried Penang
and Malacca merchants, by the early 1830s, so great was Singapore’s
commercial dominance that merchants and officials at the other
ports had come to accept the commercial leadership of the Singapore
mercantile community. Economic developments consolidated this new
order. Increasingly commercial interests in Penang and Malacca saw
their respective ports less as entrepôts aspiring to dominate the
commerce of the region, and more as localised commercial centres
with local and specialised trading interests, especially in the Malay
Peninsula and the north east coast of Sumatra. The growth of tin
production in the Western Malay peninsula, and close links between
Penang, Malacca and the tin producing states of Perak and Selangor,
reinforced this specialisation which was complementary to, rather
than in competition with, the role of Singapore. Penang’s commerce,
in particular, became subordinate and complementary to Singapore.
It had dominated trade with the north-west coast of Sumatra and
the ports of the Bay of Bengal, whilst it and Province Wellesley had
produced plantation crops such as pepper and sugar. These fashioned
a commercial identity which was compatible with the leadership of
Singapore.
Another factor, which encouraged mutual assistance among the
Straits interests, was the impact of the great Calcutta financial crisis
of the early 1830s. This swept away most of the Indian agency houses
with whom Straits merchants had traded extensively, and upon whose
political clout they had relied. Although new merchant firms replaced
them, they never developed the close ties with the Straits Settlements
which characterized the relationships enjoyed with the older agency
houses. This reflected the fact that since the opening of trade from
Britain to India and Southeast Asia in 1813, direct commerce between
Southeast Asia and Britain had grown in importance, overtaking the
trade between India and the Straits. Singapore’s rapid growth from the
1820s was based largely on the distribution of British manufactures,
especially Lancashire cotton cloth. The value of British exports to
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Singapore rose from about $1million in 1823–1824 to over $3millions
by 1830–1831, though they fell back to just over $1 million per
annum in the late-1830s.34 Nonetheless, opium imports from India
remained crucial for British and Straits Chinese commercial interests,
constituting a lucrative item in its own right and an important source
of revenue for the Straits Settlements.35 However, the strong political
alliances between Indian based and Straits-based European merchant
firms which characterized the first few decades of the nineteenth
century, no longer prevailed.
In Penang, Singapore and Malacca, there emerged a stronger sense
of identity amongst the European communities in the Straits, as the
social structures and ethnic mix of the three settlements converged.
A small group of European merchants set the tone of social and
political life. The emergent milieu was male-dominated, preoccupied
with commercial questions, and suspicious of government.36 By the
1830s the European communities were developing an independent
voice through several key institutions. The foreman of the Grand Jury,
for example, was empowered to present collective grievances to the
Straits government. The senior merchants who dominated this body
were eager to protect mercantile liberties.37 Newspapers were also
important organs, notably the Singapore Free Press and the Straits Times,
established in 1835 and 1845 respectively. Together with the Penang
Gazette these were powerful champions of the mercantile interest.38
There was also the eastablishment in the 1830s of the Chambers of
Commerce for Penang and Singapore. The British elite had much
in common with similar British communities in Asia. It was socially
exclusive, rejecting lower class whites as well as other ethnicities.39
This sense of superiority sprang partly from the importance of kinship
in recruiting new staff for the merchant houses of the Straits, and was
reinforced by the exclusivity of social recreational organisations such
as the clubs,Masonic lodges, and sporting events which emerged in the
Straits during this period. The snobbishness, racism and exclusivity of
34 Wong Lin Ken, (1960). The Trade of Singapore 1819–69, Journal of the Malaysian
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 33:4, 11–301.
35 Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists, p. 124.
36 Turnbull, C. M. (1972). The Straits Settlements 1826–67: Indian Presidency to Crown
Colony (Athlone Press, London), p. 316.
37 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826–67, pp. 134–135.
38 Ibid., pp. 131–132.
39 Trocki, C. A. (2006). Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (Routledge,
London), pp. 44–45.
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the British community in the Straits were also evident in other Asian
port cities, notably in Shanghai.40
The Straits newspapers frequently stereotyped and ridiculed the
Chinese and Malay communities. For example, in August 1853 the
Singapore Free Press reported that the Malay and Chinese communities
at the port were convinced that St Andrew’s church was infested
by evil spirits, which were appeased by a government-inspired
campaign of murders.41 But relations between the British and the
ethnic communities of the Straits were more complex than this
contemptuous tone might suggest. After all, the British relied upon
Chinese and Malay middlemen who dealt with the diverse south-
east Asian traders visiting the Straits Settlements. The Chinese, who
massively outnumbered the Europeans, were quite an intimidating
presence, especially with the outbreak of Triad-linked violence in the
1840s.42 Chinese opium farms also provided the Straits government
with much of its revenue.43 While Asian middlemen were common
throughout the British empire in Asia, the prominence of the Chinese
in the Straits Settlements helped to create a distinctive Straits and
southeast Asian identity.44 Indeed, Frost shows how experience of
Singapore by Chinese immigrants helped forge a wider sense of
Chinese identity.45 In the 1830s and 1840s, the distinctive role
of the Chinese was reinforced by their growing importance in the
development of agriculture and tin mining. In Province Wellesley
and Penang, Chinese planters developed sugar plantations, whilst in
Singapore they led the way in pepper and gambier (for the tanning
process) cultivation.46 Malacca boasted one of the oldest Chinese
communities, which by the 1840s was also involved in tin mining.
Chinese involvement in tin mining generally in the Western Malay
states resulted in a rapid growth in population as Chinese labourers
40 Bickers, R. (1998). Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British
Settler Community in Shanghai 1843–1937, Past and Present, 159, 161–211.
41 Singapore Free Press (SFP), 26 August, 1853.
42 SFP, 9 June 1842, on the riots of that year.
43 Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture, pp. 86–92.
44 Rajat Kanta Ray (1995). Asian Capital in the Age of European Domination: The
Rise of the Bazaar 1800–1914,Modern Asian Studies, 29:3, 449–554, especially p. 466.
45 Frost, M. R. (2005). Emporium in Imperio: Nanyang Networks and the Straits
Chinese in Singapore, 1819–1914, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36:1, 29–66.
46 Tan Kim Heng, (1981). Chinese Sugar Planting and Social Mobility in
Nineteenth Century Province Wellesley, Malaysia in History, 24, 24–38, especially p.
30; Ray, AsianCapital, p. 504; Petition toHouse of Commons by Singaporemerchants
on pepper duties, December 1847, Boards Collections F/4/2268 (115434), pp. 7–8.
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(Sinkeys) flooded in to work in the tin mines. By 1850 about 5,000
Chinese worked in the Malacca mines, while 3,000 Sinkeys arrived
each month to work mines all over the Western Malay states.47 This
expansion of the Chinese population in the Straits brought distinctive
socio-economic features. These included the prominence of opium as
a commodity for trade, consumption and as a source of government
revenue through ‘opium farming’: the government sale to Chinese
syndicates of exclusive rights to retail the commodity. Opium also
furnished large profits for those wealthy Chinese merchants (Towkays)
who controlled tinmining, enabling them to ensure that their Chinese
labourers remained indebted and working in the mines, as the latter
borrowed to finance their purchases of the drug.48 With the influx
of Chinese labourers, the ethnically based clans (Kongsis) grew in
influence and rivalry, leading to outbreaks of violence between them
in the Straits Settlements and later in the Malay Peninsula.49 This
convergence of ethnic mix and their accompanying social relations in
the Straits Settlements helped create a distinctive sense of identity
within their communities.
Lynn Hollen Lees shows that this mixture of British racist rejection,
fear of, and economic dependence upon the Chinese, influenced the
development of a wider sense of British identity in the Straits and of
what became British Malaya.50 In order to prosper in the multi-ethnic
environment of the Straits Settlements, intermediary entrepreneurial
ethnic groups such as the Chinese had to make themselves acceptable
to different communities; effectively ‘switching identity’ in order to do
business.51 Lees argues that in time, this developed into a ‘two-tier’
notion of ‘Britishness’ in Malaya: a version based on strict racial and
cultural separateness held by thewhiteBritish elite, and another based
upon a more egalitarian notion of the ‘British subject’ encompassing
all those under imperial rule and contributing to the benefits of
empire. This second definition of ‘Britishness’ became by the end
47 Report on the tin mines at Malacca, 29 April 1851. Boards Collections F/4/2502
(142029), pp. 7–31, 20–22.
48 Trocki, C. A. (1987), The Rise of Singapore’s Great Opium Syndicate 1840–
1886, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 18:1, 58–80, especially p. 79.
49 Trocki, C. A. (1990). Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800–
1910 (Cornell UP, Ithaca), pp. 82–116.
50 Hollen Lees, Lynn (2009). Being British in Malaya, 1890–1940, Journal of British
Studies, 48:1, 76–101.
51 Hollen Lees, Being British inMalaya, p. 78; see also T. Harper, (2002). ‘Empire,
Diaspora and the Languages of Globalism, 1850–1914’ in Hopkins, A. G. (ed.),
Globalization in World History (Pimlico, London 2002), pp. 141–166.
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of the nineteenth century one to which Chinese, Malays and Indians
in Malaya could appeal in their dealings with the white imperial elite.
Moreover such appeals could not easily be dismissed by the latter,
given their economic dependence upon these communities, and their
wider ideological justifications of empire as a civilising mission. The
growth of the Chinese community in the Straits before 1860 saw the
beginnings of this layered or ‘federated’ concept of ‘Britishness’ in
Malaya.
But the development of a Straits politico-commercial consciousness
also reflected the emergence of new commercial interests in Britain
which had been challenging the East India Company since the
beginning of the century. Merchants and manufacturers in Liverpool,
Birmingham, Bristol and Glasgow had organised pressure groups
which lobbied the British state to open the Indian trade in 1813.52
Subsequently, trade between these provincial cities and SoutheastAsia
expanded rapidly, especially the export of British manufactures such
as cotton goods, but also the import of Straits produce, mainly pepper
and sugar. But the period 1813 to 1830 saw only limited activity, as
most East India trade associations which had lobbied government to
liberalise the Indian trade were wound up following the passing of
the 1813 Charter Act. The exception was the Liverpool East India
Association which was reformed in 1817 and continued to lobby on a
range of issues, including a campaign in the 1820s to equalise duties
on East and West Indian sugar, which suited the interests of the
Penang sugar planters and merchants.53 But it was the launching in
1829 of a new campaign against the remaining East India Company
monopoly of trade to China, which saw a radical change in the political
landscape of Asian commerce. This time the East India Associations
were reformed on a permanent basis, and they continued to be active
even after the 1833 Charter Act. Moreover they collaborated with
each other in interviews with ministers and petitions to parliament
throughout the 1830s and 1840s.54 So successful were they that, in
1836, a London East India and China Association was established in
52 Yukihisa Kumagai, (2008). The Lobbying Activities of Provincial Mercantile and
Manufacturing Interests against the Renewal of the East India Company’s Charter, 1812–13
and 1829–1833 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow).
53 Report of a Committee of the Liverpool East India Association appointed to
take into consideration the Restrictions on the East India trade—Presented to the
Association at a General Meeting 9 May 1822, Liverpool Record Office H380.6EAS.
54 See Webster A. (2006). The Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism:
The London East India Agency Houses, Provincial Commercial Interests, and the
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imitation of Liverpool and Glasgow, which quickly established contact
with the provincial organisations. By the late 1830s, this British
network of commercial interest groups interested in the Asian empire
was joined by Chambers of Commerce established in Asian ports,
including Calcutta (1834), Canton (1834) Bombay and Madras (both
1836) and, crucially, in Singapore and Penang in 1837.55 Malacca,
which remained strongly Dutch in culture and population stayed
aloof from these developments, but by 1853 it had a Chamber of
Agriculture, which spoke for landholders, most of whom were also
merchants, on land ownership.56 The Straits Settlements had become
part of a network of imperial commercial interests, within which India
was but one component. Thiswas an opportunity for Straitsmerchants,
with their new sense of identity, to maximise their political impact by
working with allies in Britain. Here was a vital source of political
leverage in the struggle against an unhelpful East India Company
administration in India.57
The Straits organisations used this network on a wide range of
issues. The earliest question which won the support of the British East
India associations was the Dutch policy of protectionism in Southeast
Asia. As early as 1831, the Glasgow East India and China Association
(GEIA) took up the campaign against high Dutch duties on imports
into Java, onwhich theywere advised by JohnCrawfurd, theOrientalist
who in 1868 became the first President of the Straits Settlements
Association.58 Crawfurd had beenGovernor of Singapore in the 1820s,
and had published on the trade and politics of Southeast Asia. He
had also been active in the anti-monopoly campaign which led to the
Charter Act of 1833. Crawfurd continued to support Straits’ causes
throughout the period, and especially against Dutch protectionism
in the 1830s and 1840s. In autumn 1835, the Glasgow East India
Association and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce lobbied
Lord Palmerston on the issue, supported by the London East India
Evolution of British Economic Policy in South and South East Asia 1800–50, Economic
History Review, 59:4, 743–764.
55 Nish, I. (1962). British Mercantile Co-operation in the India-China Trade from
the End of the East India Company’s Trading Monopoly, Journal of Southeast Asian
History, 3:2, 74–91.
56 Resident Councillor atMalacca, J. Ferrier to Governor of the Straits Settlements
25 October 1853, Boards Collections F/4/2604 (163062), pp. 3–9.
57 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, p. 327.
58 Kumagai, The Lobbying Activities of Provincial Mercantile and Manufacturing Interests,
pp. 139–140.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 23 Oct 2013 IP address: 193.63.36.50
BRIT I SH COMMERCIAL AND POLIT ICAL NETWORKS 915
and China Association (LEICA).59 In 1838, London again lobbied
Palmerston on Dutch interference with Singapore’s trade through the
high Java duties.60 Two years later, the PenangChamber ofCommerce
requested support from both GEIA and LEICA to make the British
government aware of the effects of Dutch protectionism in Sumatra
on Penang’s commerce.61 As late as 1849, LEICA was still pressing
the British government to act against Dutch protectionism.62
Commerce in Southeast Asia deteriorated in the 1830s and 1840s,
and this intensified the fear of the Dutch. The Calcutta financial crisis
of the early 1830s damaged trading interests in the Straits.63 The war
with China of 1839 to 1842 ended with the Treaty of Nanking, which
gave the British Hong Kong. This new port competed with Singapore,
and merchants at the latter found that in the 1840s, because of
Hong Kong and Dutch protectionism, their trading links increasingly
focussed on the Malay Peninsula, Siam Sumatra and Borneo. The
proportion of Singapore’s trade with the Malay Peninsula grew from
15 per cent in 1825 to 34 per cent in 1845, while its trade with
the islands of the Malay archipelago fell from 74 per cent to 53 per
cent during the same period.64 It was as if the circle of Singapore’s
geographical commercial reach was shrinking. Little wonder then that
the period saw heightened anxiety and political activity amongst the
merchants of the Straits Settlements.
The second major issue on which the Straits interests resorted to
their allies in Britain was an attempt by the East India Company in
the mid-1830s to impose trade duties at Penang and Singapore. This
policy arose as a result of another serious problem faced by the Straits
merchants: piracy. In May 1835, merchants in Singapore reported a
severe increase in the frequency of attacks by pirates on the Chinese
and Malay vessels trading with Singapore. They requested increased
59 Thomas Boothman, Secretary to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to
the Glasgow East India Association (GEIA) 21 November 1835, Glasgow East India
Association papers,Mitchell Library, Glasgow,MS891001/7, p. 27; London East India
and China Association (LEICA) to GEIA 10 October 1836, MS891001/7, p. 79, GEIA
papers.
60 LEICA to GEIA 23 February 1838 MS891001/8, p. 60.
61 George Waller, Penang to GEIA 15 October 1840 MS891001/9, p. 63.
62 LEICA 14th Annual Report 1850, pp. 8–9.
63 Trocki, Opium and Empire, pp. 59–63.
64 Wong Lin Ken, (1978). Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt port 1819–1941,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 9:1, 50–84, especially p. 54.
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policing of the waters of the Straits.65 The Company tried to finance
the suppression of piracy by raising duties on the commerce of the
Straits Settlements, ending the longstanding policy of free trade.66
In January 1836, the Singapore merchants petitioned against the
proposal, and the ensuing campaign led to the establishment of the
SingaporeChamber ofCommerce in February1837.67 This time, their
efforts were successful. Theymobilised the support of theGlasgow and
London East India Associations, whose remonstrations to the India
Office in London produced a climb-down on the issue.68
TheStraitsmerchants built on this success. In1837 theGovernment
of India appointed a special commissioner, R. Young, to report
on the regulations governing land tenure in the Straits, with a
view to imposing a uniform system based on principles of English
law.69 The Governor-General believed that land leases granted to
tenants should not exceed 20 years in duration, though they might
perhaps be renewable for a period of 30 years on completion of the
initial 20-year term.70 The Singapore merchants recruited LEICA
and John Crawfurd to intercede on their behalf. Crawfurd penned a
memorandum to the Court of Directors on the value of long leases
for tropical colonies, because of the long-term returns on tropical
crops, especially in an uncertain international market.71 Crawfurd
stressed that cloves and nutmeg required over a decade to come into
production, and reached maturity in their twentieth year, rendering
a 20-year lease inadequate. He argued that Company officials in
London and Bengal understood little about the peculiar conditions of
agriculture and trade in Southeast Asia. It was a complaint that would
appear repeatedly in the correspondence of Straits merchants, and
was reinforced by the Singapore Free Press which was fiercely critical of
65 C. R. Read, Hamilton, Fox and Boustead to Sir Charles Metcalfe, 25 May 1835
(with enclosed petition from Singapore merchants), Boards Collections F/4/1724,
pp. 83–87.
66 Wong Lin Ken, (1960). The Trade of Singapore 1819–69, Journal of the Malaysian
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 33:4, 11–301, especially p. 182.
67 Buckley, C. (1902). An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore Vol 1 (Fraser and
Neave, Singapore), pp. 313–314.
68 LEICA to GEIA 25 August 1836, India Board to GEIA 26 August 1836,
MS891001/7, pp. 73–74.
69 Government of India to the Court of Directors 7 February 1838 BCF/4/1903
(81155), pp. 3–5.
70 Government of India to Court of Directors 18 July 1838, p. 25.
71 LEICA to the Court of Directors 23 May 1838 (enclosing Crawfurd’s
memorandum) Boards Collections F/4/1905 (81167), pp. 1–41.
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Young and published letters opposing the regulations.72 The pressure
from London and the Straits merchants worked. In April 1840, the
Indian government recommended longer leases of at least 50 years to
the Court of Directors.73 Without doubt this was a formative period in
the development of the Straits commercial and political identity, and
it instilled a sense of confidence that with a united front and with the
help of their friends in Britain, the mismanagement of the East India
Company could be curbed.
Between the 1830s and the 1850s, the Straits merchants kept
their allies in London, Liverpool and Glasgow fully briefed on Straits
matters, providing, for example, details of the volume of trade.74
Political links were cemented by commercial relations with merchants
in Britain. As members of Straits firms retired to Britain, they
frequently set up ‘sister’ firms which did business with their Straits
counterparts. For example, by 1846, the Singapore firm of William
Paterson & Co. had several partners in Glasgow, who, by 1852, had
established the firm of McEwen & Co.75 In 1842, the Singapore firm
of Boustead Schwabe & Co. were closely linked with Sykes, Schwabe
& Co. of Liverpool.76 A year later, the Liverpool firm of Middletons,
Blundell & Co. had a partner, William Blundell, who acted for the
Liverpool firm in Singapore.77 In the 1840s and 1850s, Hamilton,
Gray&Co. had partners in bothGlasgow and Singapore.78 By the early
1860s, shortly before they went bankrupt, they were shipping pepper
to London on behalf of the Glasgow firm of Buchanan, Hamilton &
Co.79 One of the emerging partners in the firm, George Garden Nicol,
eventually became Chairman of the Chartered Mercantile Bank of
India, London and China in 1860.80 In 1852, the Singapore firm of
William Macdonald & Co. was launched, with partners in Singapore
72 SFP 19 April 1838; 3 May 1838 and 31 May 1838.
73 Government of India to Court of Directors 20 April 1840 Boards Collections
F/4/1903 (81155), pp. 137–152, especially pp. 143–144.
74 Singapore Chamber of Commerce to GEIA, 6 November 1845 MS891001/10,
p. 60.
75 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 380.
76 Ibid., p. 398.
77 Ibid., p. 401.
78 Ibid., p. 566.
79 Case of Ashton & Others vs Bauer and others, Singapore 25 October 1866, in Kyshe,
J. W. N. (1885). Cases Heard and Determined in Her Majesty’s Supreme Court of the Straits
Settlements 1808–1884 (Singapore & Straits Printing Office, Singapore), pp. 164–165.
80 Kyshe, Cases Heard, p. 566.
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and Glasgow.81 By the late 1860s, Macdonald & Co. were acting as
commission agents for a Scottish gunpowder manufacturer.82
By the 1850s, a coterie of wealthy and influential Singapore
merchants had retired to Britain, where they formed a vocal pro-
Straits lobby, including such men as Alexander Guthrie and Edward
Boustead.83 Penang also enjoyed its British connections. In the mid-
1840s, Brown & Co. of Penang shipped sugar to Hossack & Co. of
Liverpool, on advances made by the Liverpool firm. In 1846 Brown
& Co. also arranged through Hossack & Co. the purchase of a steam
engine from Scott, Sinclair &Co. of Glasgow to power the sugarmill of
oneMr Rodyk, a sugar planter. TheGlasgow firm had already supplied
a similarmachine toMrDonnadieu, a neighbour of Rodyk’s.84 Political
connections with London and the cities of provincial Britain were thus
underpinned by equally close commercial links.
Mercantile collective action in the Straits becamemore persistent as
merchants struggled to cope with a difficult economic environment.
In February 1840, the Penang Chamber of Commerce lobbied the
Straits Governor and the Government of Bengal to relax regulations
restricting the felling of timber on the island, allowing merchants
to export wood and sell it for the refitting of ships. But the Bengal
authorities refused, on the grounds that the cleared land would be
difficult to convert to agriculture. This confirmed the impression in
the Straits that Company servants were indifferent to the needs of
Straits merchants.85 A year later, the Penang merchants and planters
lobbied the Company authorities in Bengal and London for their sugar
and rum to be admitted into Britain at the lower rate of duty as
determined by the Sugar Act of 1836. The Straits Settlements had
been excluded from its provisions because foreign sugar was permitted
to be imported into the Straits, leaving the possibility that it would
be illicitly exported to Britain disguised as Straits produce.86 In 1841,
36 Europeans and numerous Chinese traders in Penang and Province
Wellesley petitioned the Governor-General in India for a ban on the
81 Ibid., p. 567.
82 Buchanan vs Kirby, Singapore 8 April 1870, in Kyshe, Cases Heard, pp. 230–231.
83 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, p. 328.
84 Scott, Sinclair & Co. vs Brown & Co., Penang 26 October 1852, in Kyshe, Cases
Heard, pp. 85–87.
85 Extract of a Public Letter from the Government of Bengal (with enclosures) 26
February 1840 Boards Collections F/4/1938 (83888), pp. 1–13
86 Government of India to the Court of Directors 20 December 1841, Boards
Collections F/4/1938 (84051), pp. 3–29.
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import of foreign sugar in order to secure rights to the lower duty
under the 1836 Act.87 Penang merchants believed that their island
could become a major producer of sugar and rum if it was allowed to
compete on an equal footing with the rest of the world. But they were
not successful. In September 1844, the Government of India refused
the Penang lobby on the grounds that any prohibition on the import
of foreign sugar into Penang would be unenforceable because of high
policing costs and the free trade traditions of the Straits.88 Inevitably
this deepened the dissatisfaction of Straits interests with the perceived
indifference of the Company. Nor was this frustration restricted to
the Straits. In September 1840, Mr William Clark, a member of the
Colonial Society of London, urged the Glasgow East India Association
to press Government to transfer governance of the Straits Settlements
from the East India Company to the Crown.89 It was a demand several
decades ahead of its time. The Singaporemerchants also railed against
the trade restrictions which had survived the general liberalisation of
British commerce of the 1830s and 1840s. In 1847 the Singapore
Chamber of Commerce petitioned the Company and the House of
Commons for a reduction in the duty on pepper.90
By the end of the 1840s a distinctive political culture was emerging
within the European mercantile communities in the Straits. In
addition to a flourishing and outspoken press, the Penang and
Singapore Chambers of Commerce exerted strong influence in Straits
affairs, backed by their British allies. Vocal critics of Company rule,
such as W. H. Read, attacked waste in the Straits administration
and ineffective policing in Singapore.91 Read became a close ally
of John Crawfurd during leave in Britain between 1848 and 1851.
This relationship became central to the campaign for Crown Colony
status in the 1850s. Moreover, this developing political consciousness
was focussed on the needs and distinctive attributes of the Malay
archipelago and Southeast Asia, rather than identifying the Straits
with the wider Asian and imperial commercial system. The Indian
authorities were seen as outsiders, with little understanding of,
87 Ibid., pp. 13–15.
88 Government of India to the Court of Directors 21 September 1844, Boards
Collections F/4/2097 (98067) pp. 1–3.
89 Clark to the Glasgow East India Association, 26 September 1840 MS891001/8,
p. 60.
90 Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors, 1 March 1848 Boards
Collections F/4/2268 (115434), pp. 1–9.
91 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, pp. 319–322.
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or sympathy for, the mercantile communities of the Straits: a
striking change from the first 20 years of the nineteenth century
when connections between the Calcutta agency houses and British
merchants in Southeast Asia had been intimate. Relations with
British-based commercial interests and pressure groups interested
in trade with south-east Asia had grown stronger, but it in no way
impaired the growth of a distinctive Southeast Asian commercial
identity amongst the British and Chinese merchants in the Straits.
Glasgow, Liverpool andLondonmerchants andEast IndiaAssociations
were allies to be cultivated, but on a basis of equality between distinct
commercial communities with their own agendas and identities.
However Malacca was not quite so easily incorporated into this
emergent collective Straits ‘front’ of commercial interests. This
stemmedprincipally from theDutch colonial legacy, and the continued
prominence of Dutch families in both the town’s governance and
in its commercial life. From the time of British acquisition under
the Treaty of 1824, two different commercial and administrative
cultures vied for dominance. The sharp differences which existed
between Malacca and Penang in the period up to 1830 were not
significantly diminished during the period of British occupancy
between 1795 and 1818. Whereas Malacca enjoyed a system of urban
administration which was over a 100 years’ old, and its own quasi-
financial institution, the Orphan Chamber, which could provide loans
for business activity, Penang’s governing institutions were new, ad-hoc
and less-well regulated.92 Regarding themselves as mere caretakers of
Malacca, the British implemented few changes in the governance of
the settlement between 1795 and 1818. But after the establishment
of permanent British control, tensions soon arose. The land revenue
tax caused much friction. Since the early days of Dutch rule, the
collection of land taxation (one tenth of the produce) inMalacca and its
environs had been undertaken by local European, Malay and Chinese
proprietors of land. They were also required tomaintain roads, bridges
and waterways. Taxes were frequently collected in kind, and these
arrangements contributed to land development in the hinterland.93
The new British administration took over land revenue collection in
the late 1820s, but soon found payment in kind onerously expensive
to administer. But it proved difficult to persuade cultivators to pay a
92 Hussin, Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka, pp. 322–323.
93 Ibid., pp. 221–224.
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money tax. They remained obdurate into the 1850s, contributing to
disputes and a loss of revenue.94
More serious was a scandal which erupted in the mid-1840s.
It concerned the close relationship between Mr Lewis, the Acting
Resident Councillor and Neubronner & Co., a Dutch trading firm.
Lewis’s brothers-in-law were partners in the firm, including Joseph,
who was also Master Attendant, in charge of supervising shipping at
the port. Thirty-seven Chinese merchants petitioned the Governor of
the Straits in August 1844.95 When the petitioners were interviewed,
it transpired that Joseph Neubronner had been using his control over
shipping to compel Chinese and Malay traders to sell their produce to
Neubronner & Co. at prices he dictated.96 He was also forcing them
to trade with Neubronner & Co. rather than with rival European
firms. Neubronner & Co.’s main competitor, Westerhout & Co., had
been challenging Neubronner & Co. in the local tin trade and other
branches of commerce since the firm’s establishment in February
1844.97 Neubronner & Co. were especially worried by Westerhout
& Co.’s success in winning over the Chieftain of Linghi, a major
local supplier of tin. Westerhout & Co. were also using political
allies to pursue private interests. A senior member of the Westerhout
family was Assistant Resident Councillor at Malacca, and he had
used his office to persuade the chieftain to switch from Neubronners
to Westerhouts. Such tactics had a long history in Malacca. It had
always been the practice of the Dutch to encourage the participation
of European merchants in the governance of the settlement, and
familial relationships betweenmerchant firms and officials were quite
common. In this context, the exercise of official authority in the
defence of private interests was seen byNeubronners andWesterhouts
as ‘normal’ practice.98 The crisis, however, resulted in closer scrutiny
of the Malacca administration by the Straits and Indian authorities,
and by the 1850s,Malacca was gradually coming to resemble the other
Straits Settlements. But as Singapore and Penang prospered, Malacca
94 J. Ferrier, Resident Councillor at Malacca to the Governor of the Straits, 17
December 1851, Boards Collections F/4/2604 (163062), pp. 18–39.
95 Governor of the Straits Settlements to A. Turnbull, Under-Secretary to the
Government of India, 28 August 1844, Boards Collections F/4/2153 (103598), p. 7.
96 Ibid., Testimony of Yap Cheeap, [8], p. 18.
97 Governor of the Straits Settlements to A. Turnbull, Under-Secretary to the
Government of India, 28 August 1844, p. 8.
98 Hussin, Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka, pp. 274–275.
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came to be regarded as the junior partner in this troika of commercial
centres.
The Drive for Crown Colony Status and the Emergence of a
‘Straits Identity’
Thus by the end of the 1840s merchants in the Straits Settlements
had come to see themselves as a distinct and beleaguered interest
group, with few friends in authority. Particular targets for their
ire were the East India Company authorities in India and London,
who, in their view, were indifferent to the needs of the Straits
commercial communities. Increasingly, Straits interests appealed to
the British Parliament and government for the redress of grievances.
Furthermore, while allies in the East India Associations of London,
Liverpool and Glasgow had helped win crucial battles over trade
duties and land tenure, there had also been defeats. The efforts of
the British East India associations to curtail Dutch protectionism in
Southeast Asia had failed. Wider geo-political priorities dictated the
British state’s tolerance of Dutch policies. Then the crisis of 1847–
1848 swept away many of the London and provincial commercial
firms connected with Asia, thus weakening links with Southeast Asia.
The Glasgow East India Association for example, was absorbed into
that city’s Chamber of Commerce in 1848. But the Straits merchants
continued to be supported by commercial pressure groups in Britain.
As late as 1866, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce were lobbying
the British government to act against Dutch aggression in Sumatra.99
In the early 1860s, members of LEICA worked closely with Crawfurd
and retired London-based Straits merchants to argue for the transfer
of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.100 They formed the
nucleus of what became the Straits Settlements Association. But in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis of1847–1848, when commercial
allies in Britain were falling like ninepins, the Straits interests had to
take the initiative in their own defence.
99 Memorial from the Directors of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to Sir
Charles Wood 20 January 1866, CO 273/9, pp. 347–348, NA.
100 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 771, 773; Petitions to Sir Frederick Rogers,
Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 19 September 1864 and 1 February
1865, CO273/8, pp. 86–88, 93–96.
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Matters came to a head in the early 1850s, triggered by a series of
contentious issues. In late 1851, to make up for revenues lost because
of the abolition of a town tax on Singapore and Penang, the Company
introduced a stamp tax on official and business transactions. The
Penang and Singapore communities lobbied against its imposition on
commercial transactions, on the grounds that it would undermine
their prosperity. The first of several public meetings was called in
September, which were memorialized to the Governor General in
October.101 The sustained campaign in London forced the Bengal
authorities to abandon the proposal. But several other issues inflamed
Straits hostility. Throughout 1852 they campaigned for judicial
reform, pressing through the Grand Jury and the Singapore Chamber
of Commerce for the appointment of a separate judge, based in
Singapore.102 Also in 1852, with the help of Crawfurd in London, the
Straits merchants agitated against high British tariffs on nutmeg.103
In May 1854 it was announced that European convicts would be
transported to Singapore from India, a decision bitterly resented by
Straits merchants already concerned by lawlessness on the island.104
The Calcutta authorities were so insistent on this policy that by
1857 it was cited as one of the principal examples of why the Straits
needed Crown Colony status.105 Then in August 1854, the Company’s
administration decided to impose upon the Straits Settlements a
copper currency based on fractions of the Indian Rupee in place of
the Spanish Dollar, which had long been the established currency for
maritime trade within the region. Singapore and Penang merchants
feared these new arrangements would be unacceptable to the Malay
and Chinese traders in Southeast Asia, on whom they depended. Once
again the SingaporeChambermobilized not only its ownmembers, but
also its allies in Britain. A public meeting was called in Singapore on
11 August 1855, parliament was petitioned, and Crawfurd once more
acted as their representative in London.106 LEICA also lobbied the
101 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 548; Memorial to the Governor-General in
Council from the merchants and inhabitants of Singapore, 15 October 1851, Boards
Collections F/4/2479, pp. 11–12.
102 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, pp. 326–327; SFP 14 January, 18 February and
8 April 1852.
103 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, p. 327; SFP 16 April 1852 (Crawfurd’s
memorandum).
104 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, p. 335.
105 Ibid., p. 348.
106 Currency Adapted to the Straits Settlements: and the Nature & Extent of the Commerce of
Singapore with Remarks on Act XVII of 1855 (Published under the Direction of the Committee
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Board of Control late in 1855.107 In Britain, 30 former Singaporeans
took up the matter with the government in parliament. Meanwhile in
the Straits, W. H. Read emerged as the most vocal of the movement’s
leaders, addressing a series of meetings.108 He was helped by the
deepening personal unpopularity of Governor Blundell, who had
shocked European society by his efforts to gain acceptance of his
Burmese mistress.109 As the matter dragged on, the Singapore press
became more strident in their criticism, and by December 1856 the
Singapore Free Press supported the pursuit of Crown Colony status.110
Ultimately, in March 1857, the Indian authorities were ordered to
drop the convict scheme.111 But in London, Crawfurd, urged on by
Read, tookmatters further and called for a fundamental change in the
governance of the Straits Settlements. He demanded Crown Colony
status, for which the Singapore Chamber also petitioned.112 These
developments coincided with the Great Indian Rebellion, in the wake
of which the East India Company’s rule was ended. Ultimately this
led to the granting of Crown Colony status to the Straits Settlements.
Merchants in the Straits quickly capitalized on the end of Company
rule. In 1859 they persuaded the British government to rescind a
Company directive forbidding the Oriental Bank to open a branch in
Singapore. Several other banks were then permitted to open branches
in Singapore and Penang.113Of course conflict between administrators
and merchants continued. It was a plan to introduce trade duties
which prompted the formation of the Straits Settlements Association
in 1868. But at least channels of decision-making were no longer
entwined with the bureaucracy of East India Company rule.
In fact the establishment of Crown Colony status proved to be a
long process, as many issues had to be resolved before the transfer
was finally agreed. But this hiatus served to strengthen consciousness
Appointed at a Public Meeting held at Singapore, August 11th 1855 (G. M. Frederick,
Singapore 1855).
107 20th report of LEICA 1856, pp. 11–12.
108 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements p. 337, 345.
109 Ibid., p. 333; SFP23 April 1857.
110 SFP 18 December 1856.
111 Wong Lin Ken, The Trade of Singapore, p. 190.
112 Crawfurd, J. (1858).Memorandum on the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca,
Penang, Singapore and Malacca (C. W. Beynell, London), p. 3.
113 Kawamura, T. (2006). ‘British Business and Empire in Asia: The Eastern
Exchange Banks, 1851–63’, in Bates, D. & Kondo, K. (eds), Migration and Identity
in British History (Proceedings of the Fifth Anglo-Japanese Conference of Historians
in London, Tokyo September), pp. 193–212, especially pp. 201–205.
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for a distinctive Straits identity, and increased awareness of the
importance of commercial links with the whole Malay archipelago.
The first signs became apparent in the campaign against the Rupee.
In August 1855 the merchants of Singapore stressed the importance
of the Spanish Dollar as a currency which had long been the principal
commercial medium of the region, binding together its ethnically
diverse mercantile communities.114 It was noted that a similar plan
had been rejected in 1837, and that the growth of regional trade
since then made the case for rejection even stronger. Implicit in this
was the notion that Southeast Asia was an economically coherent and
distinct region.115 In 1857, Singapore merchants berated the Indian
government’s failure to appreciate the unique nature of the Straits
Settlements, and for viewing it from ‘an exclusively Indian point of
view’.116
In the following March, a lively debate in parliament about the
future of the Straits prompted The Times to comment that:
What has Singapore to do with India? It carries on a larger trade with China
than with India. The true idea of the settlement, colony, or by whatever name
it may be called, is as the centre and citadel of British power in the Eastern
Seas, and the great house of call between Great Britain and China. It is from
this point chiefly that the ceaseless intrigues of the Dutch to exclude us from
the Indian archipelago can be defeated.117
After 1858, when the transfer of the Straits Settlements became
the main focus of discussion, Straits supporters of the policy stressed
the long-term financial viability of the proposed Crown Colony. The
Colonial Office insisted that the Straits should furnish sufficient
revenues to cover administrative and defence costs. In response,
the Straits interests were adamant about their ability to unify the
commerce of the region, which had been growing since the 1830s and
to meet all requirements. In 1861 the former Singapore merchant
Alexander Guthrie stressed that Singapore could certainly cover its
own costs, and that Penang and Malacca would do so within ten
114 Notes on the Straits Currency, Public Meeting at Singapore 11 August 185,
Currency Adapted to the Straits Settlements: and the Nature and Extent of the
Commerce of Singapore with Remarks on Act VII of 1855 (published under the
direction of the Committee appointed at a public meeting held at Singapore, 11
August 1855, G. M. Frederick of Singapore), p. 1.
115 Notes on the Straits Currency, p. 7.
116 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 755.
117 Ibid., p. 763
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years.118 He also noted how Singapore, as the trading centre in the
region, linkedCambodia, theMalay archipelago and Siam, creating an
identifiable commercial unity.119 Moreover, he stressed the need for
the Straits government to be given a free hand in developing its own
foreign policy in the region, enabling it to become a unifying political
influence throughout the region.120While theDutch inevitably limited
such ambitions, Guthrie thought of Southeast Asia as a unified entity,
capable in theory at least of informal British commercial and political
leadership. This was a common view in the Straits by the early
1860s, contrary to the scepticism of earlier historians.121 Moreover,
the idea of the Straits Settlements exerting informal control over
a broad sweep of the Malay archipelago was shared in high places.
As early as January 1859, the Earl of Carnarvon, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office supported the transfer of the
Straits to the Colonial Office, provided the requirements of financial
viability could be met. Referring specifically to Crawfurd’s writings,
Carnarvon agreed that the Straits Settlements were no longer part
of the Indian empire. He envisaged the Straits would ‘become links
in the natural chain of colonial dependencies, from Ceylon through
the Indian archipelago to the northern coasts of Australia’.122 He
believed that the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong would become
links in a chain of ports from Australia to the Malay archipelago,
forming ‘a cluster of dependencies homogenous at least in many of
its principal parts’.123 Clearly, within the Colonial Office, there were
those who saw the Straits Settlements as the centre of a regional
British sphere of influence. The debate about the financial viability
of the Straits Settlements dragged on into the mid-1860s, with the
Straits merchants eventually winning the argument that the Straits
Settlements constituted a financially viable colony.124 By the time this
status was granted in 1868 allies in London were poised to establish
representation in the new Straits Settlements Association.
118 Guthrie, A. (1861). The British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca (London), p. 13.
119 Ibid., pp. 7–8
120 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
121 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements, p. 379.
122 Carnarvon’s report to Sir Edward Lefton on the proposed transfer of the Straits
Settlements to the Colonial Office, 20 January 1859, CO 273/7, pp. 2–17, especially
p. 11.
123 Ibid., p. 12.
124 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, pp. 773–780.
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Conclusion
What was the significance of these developments? Several main points
should be emphasized. First, the period from about 1830 until 1858
saw the emergence of a collective sense of identity within the Straits
commercial community, which came to see SoutheastAsia as a discrete
economic region with its own needs. These could not be left to
decision-makers outside the region whose priorities lay elsewhere.
Reid has shown that this regional coherence, based on maritime
commercial networks, was of ancient origin. Recently historians have
stressed the importance of networks in the consolidation of imperial
social and governing structures, especially in the creation of lines of
communication throughwhich common interests could be established,
ideas exchanged and a sense of shared purpose fashioned.125 The
flourishing of trading networks under British imperial influence
in the nineteenth century helped recreate this sense of regional
identity amongst Europeans, Chinese andMalays. It was strengthened
by the emergence of commercial organisations which underpinned
mercantile solidarity, especially on Penang and Singapore. It can
be argued that the revival of consciousness of Southeast Asia as a
distinct region can be traced back to these developments. Of crucial
importance to this emerging sense of identity was the consolidation
of an active colonial public sphere in the Straits, which matured in
the 1850s.126 The enduring role of the Grand Jury, the outspoken
confidence of the Straits press and the dogged activism of the
Chambers of Commerce all seemed to come into their own in that
decade. The longstanding Straits defence of free trade found a new
resonancewith politicians in Britain, whowere increasingly embracing
free trade and laissez-faire ideas. It was significant that attitudes in
Westminster to the Company were hardening in this ideological
climate, as demonstrated in the further restrictions placed on its
125 Ballantyne, T. (2002). Aryanism in the British Empire (Palgrave, Basingstoke),
pp. 14–16; McVey, ‘Afterword: In praise of the Coelacanth’s Cousin’, in Kratoska,
Raben & Nordholt (eds), Locating Southeast Asia, pp. 308–319; Hall, C. and Rose, S. O.
(2002). ‘Introduction: being at homewith the empire’, inHall, C. andRose, S.O. (eds),
AtHomewith theEmpire:MetropolitanCulture and the ImperialWorld (CambridgeUniversity
Press, Cambridge), pp. 1–31, especially pp. 6–7.
126 Harper, T. (1997). Globalism and the Pursuit of Authenticity: the Making of a
Diasporic Public Sphere in Singapore, Sojourn, 12:2, 261–92.
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privileges by the Charter Act of 1853.127 Moreover, although ethnic
divisions within the Straits communities persisted, and were in many
senses hardening, there was a growing recognition of a common
interest in promoting free trade in Southeast Asia, and a belief that
British influence was the best way to achieve this. Thus, at the public
meeting on Singapore in August 1855 which protested against the
imposition of Indian currency in the Straits, two prominent Chinese
merchants, Tan Kim Cheng and Tan Kimseng (also a Justice of
the Peace) were amongst the merchants and individuals intent on
petitioning parliament.128 Buckley identified the Chinese merchant
‘Mr Whampoa’ (Hoo Ah Kay) in this period as a trusted pillar of the
wider mercantile community.129 There were numerous examples of
leading Chinese merchants joining their European peers in common
cause and commercial pressure groups. In 1853, 10 Chinese business
men joined 10 Europeans in forming the Malacca Agricultural
Association.130 That body, and some 27 Chinese merchants and 11
Europeans, petitioned the Malacca administration for various land
reforms just several weeks later.131 In such collaborations lay the
beginnings of the ‘federated’ notion of ‘Britishness’ in Malaya and
the Straits as identified by Lees.132
Thenetworkwhich linked the Straits Settlements to pressure groups
in British cities was crucial in the growth of this confident, activist
identity in the Straits. It guided British imperial policy on questions of
free trade versus trade taxes, currency, banking and the government of
the Straits Settlements. It linked metropole to periphery, exchanged
information, and orchestrated lobbying across the globe. Policy was not
dictated by a handful of super-rich ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ in London,
though they were certainly part of the network. Rather it was shaped
by the interaction of a range of interests, including industrialists and
merchants in the British provinces, London financiers and merchants
127 Webster, A. (2009). The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-
Asian Commerce and Politics 1790–1860 (Boydell, Woodbridge), pp. 136–137.
128 Currency Adapted to the Straits Settlements: and the Nature & Extent of the Commerce of
Singapore with Remarks on Act XVII of 1855 (Published under the Direction of the Committee
Appointed at a Public Meeting held at Singapore, August 11th 1855 (G. M. Frederick,
Singapore 1855).
129 Buckley, An Anecdotal History, pp. 658–659.
130 Meeting of Malacca Inhabitants, 30 July 1853, Boards Collections F/4/2604
(163047), pp. 17–20.
131 Petition to Resident Councillor at Malacca 26 August 1853, Boards Collections
F/4/2604 (163047), pp. 29–37.
132 Lees, Being British in Malaya.
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in Southeast Asia. Out of these global, imperial and regional
developments emerged a sense of the importance, uniqueness and
identity of the British presence in Southeast Asia, which increasingly
marked out the region as a separate entity, especially in the minds of
British imperialists.
